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It is usually assumed that the quantum state is sufficient for deducing all probabilities for a system.
This may be true when there is a single observer, but it is not true in a universe large enough that
there are many copies of an observer. Then the probability of an observation cannot be deduced
simply from the quantum state (say as the expectation value of the projection operator for the
observation, as in traditional quantum theory). One needs additional rules to get the probabilities.
What these rules are is not logically deducible from the quantum state, so the quantum state itself
is insufficient for deducing observational probabilities. This is the measure problem of cosmology.
PACS numbers: PACS 03.65.Ta, 03.65.Ca, 02.50.Cw, 98.80.Qc,
I. INTRODUCTION
All probabilities for a system are believed to be en-
coded in its quantum state. This may be true, but there
is the question of how to decode the quantum state to
give these probabilities. In traditional quantum theory,
the probabilities are given by the expectation values of
projection operators. Once a possible observation is spec-
ified (including the corresponding projection operator),
then its probability is given purely by the quantum state
as the expectation value the state assigns to the projec-
tion operator, a mathematization of the Born rule [1].
This prescription works well in ordinary single lab-
oratory settings, where there are no copies of the ob-
server. Then distinct observations are mutually exclu-
sive, so that different ones cannot both be observed. If
one assigns a projection operator to each possible dis-
tinct observation in a complete exhaustive set, then these
projection operators will be orthonormal, and their (non-
negative) expectation values will sum to unity, which are
conditions necessary for them to be interpreted as the
probabilities of the different possible observations.
However, in cosmology there is the possibility that the
universe is so large that there are many copies of each ob-
server, no matter how precisely the observer is defined.
This raises the problem [2, 3, 4, 5] that two observa-
tions that are seen as distinct for an observer are not
mutually exclusive in a global viewpoint; both can occur
for different copies of the observer (though neither copy
may be aware of that). This would not be a problem
for a putative superobserver who can observe all possi-
ble sets of observations by all observers over the entire
universe, but it is a problem for the assignment of nor-
malized probabilities for the possible observations that
are distinct for each copy of the observer. The result [4]
is that one cannot get such a set of normalized probabil-
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ities as the expectation values of projection operators in
the full quantum state of the universe.
One can still postulate that there are rules for get-
ting the probabilities of all possible observations from the
quantum state, but then the question arises as to what
these rules are. Below we shall give examples of several
different possibilities for these rules, showing that they
are not uniquely determined and thus that they are log-
ically independent of the question of what the quantum
state is. Therefore, the quantum state just by itself is in-
sufficient to determine the probabilities of observations.
The main application of the logical independence of
the probability rules is to the measure problem in cosmol-
ogy (see [5] for many references), the problem of how to
make statistical predictions for observations in a universe
that may be so large that almost all theoretically possi-
ble observations actually occur somewhere. The logical
independence implies that the solution to the measure
problem is not just the quantum state of the universe but
also other independent elements, the rules for getting the
probabilities of the observations from the quantum state.
II. OBSERVATIONAL PROBABILITIES WITH
MANY COPIES OF THE OBSERVER
A goal of science is to come up with theories Ti that
predict the probabilities of results of observations (obser-
vational results). Here for simplicity I shall assume that
there is a countable set of possible distinct observations
Oj out of some exhaustive set of all such observations.
This set of possible observations might be, for example,
all possible conscious perceptions [6], all possible data
sets for one person, all possible contents for an eprint
arXiv, or all possible data sets for a human scientific in-
formation gathering and utilizing system [2]. If one imag-
ines a continuum for the set of observations (which seems
to be logically possible, though not required), in that case
I shall assume that they are binned into a countable num-
ber of exclusive and exhaustive subsets that each may be
2considered to form one distinct observation Oj . Then the
goal is to calculate the probability Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) for
the observation Oj , given the theory Ti.
One might think that once one has the quantum state,
there would be a standard answer to the question of the
probabilities for the various possible observations. For
example [4], one might take traditional quantum theory
(what I there called standard quantum theory) to give the
probability Pj(i) of the observation as the expectation
value, in the quantum state given by the theory Ti, of a
projection operator Pj onto the observational result Oj .
That is, one might take
Pj(i) = 〈Pj〉i, (2.1)
where 〈〉i denotes the quantum expectation value of
whatever is inside the angular brackets in the quantum
state i given by the theory Ti. This traditional approach
works in the case of a single laboratory setting where the
projection operators onto different observational results
are orthogonal, PjPk = δjkPj (no sum over repeated
indices).
However [4, 5], in the case of a sufficiently large uni-
verse, one may have observation Oj occurring ‘here’ and
observation Ok occurring ‘there’ in a compatible way, so
that Pj and Pk are not orthogonal. Then the traditional
quantum probabilities given by Eq. (2.1) will not be nor-
malized to obey
∑
j
Pj(i) = 1. (2.2)
Thus one needs a different formula for normalizable prob-
abilities of a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of
possible observations, when distinct observations within
the complete set cannot be described by orthogonal pro-
jection operators.
Although many other rules are also possible, as I shall
illustrate below, the simplest class of modifications of
Eq. (2.1) would seem to be to replace the projection op-
erators Pj with some other observation operators Qj(i)
normalized so that
∑
j〈Qj(i)〉i = 1, giving
Pj(i) = 〈Qj(i)〉i. (2.3)
Of course, one also wants Pj(i) ≥ 0 for each i and j, so
one needs to impose the requirement that the expectation
value of each observation operator Qj(i) in each theory
Ti is nonnegative.
The main point [4, 5] is that in cases with more than
one copy of the observer, such as in a large enough uni-
verse, one cannot simply use the expectation values of
projection operators as the probabilities of observations,
so that, if Eq. (2.3) is to apply, each theory must as-
sign a set of observation operators Qj(i), corresponding
to the set of possible observations Oj , whose expectation
values are used instead as the probabilities of the obser-
vations. Since these observation operators are not given
directly by the formalism of traditional quantum theory,
they must be added to that formalism by each particular
complete theory. In other words, a complete theory Ti
cannot be given merely by the dynamical equations and
initial conditions (the quantum state), but it also requires
the set of observation operators Qj(i) whose expectation
values are the probabilities of the observations Oj in the
complete set of possible observations (or else some other
rule for the probabilities, if they are not to be expecta-
tion values of operators). The probabilities are not given
purely by the quantum state but have their own logical
independence in a complete theory.
Let us suppose that we can hypothetically partition
spacetime into a countable set of disjoint regions labeled
by the index L, with each region having its own reference
frame and being sufficiently small that for each L sepa-
rately there is a set of orthogonal projection operators
PLj whose expectation values give good approximations
to the probabilities that the observations Oj occur within
the region L. Each region has its own algebra of quantum
operators, and for simplicity I shall make the somewhat
unrealistic assumption that the regions are either space-
like separated or are so far apart that each operator in
one region, such as PLj , commutes with each observable
in a different region, such as PMk for L 6= M . (However,
I am assuming that each observation Oj can in princi-
ple occur within any of the regions, so that the content
of the observation is not sufficient to distinguish what L
is; the observation does not determine where one is in
spacetime. One might imagine that an observation de-
termines as much as it is possible to know about some
local region, but it does not determine the properties out-
side, which might go into the specification of the index L
that is only known to a hypothetical superobserver that
makes the partition.)
Now one might propose that one construct the projec-
tion operator
Pj = I−
∏
L
(I−PLj ) (2.4)
(this being the only place where I need the PLj ’s to com-
mute for different L) and use it in Eq. (2.1) to get a
putative probability of the observation Oj in the quan-
tum state given by the theory Ti. Indeed, this is essen-
tially in quantum language [4] what Hartle and Srednicki
[2] propose, that the probability of an observation is the
probability that it occur at least somewhere. However,
because the different Pj ’s defined this way are not or-
thogonal, the resulting traditional quantum probabilities
given by Eq. (2.1) will not be normalized to obey Eq.
(2.2). This lack of normalization is a consequence of the
fact that even though it is assumed that two different
observations Oj and Ok (with j 6= k) cannot both oc-
cur within the same region L, one can have Oj occurring
within one region and Ok occurring within another re-
gion. Therefore, the existence of the observation Oj at
least somewhere is not incompatible with the existence of
the distinct observationOk somewhere else, so the sum of
the existence probabilities is not constrained to be unity.
3If one were the hypothetical superobserver who has ac-
cess to what is going on in all the regions, one could make
up a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of joint ob-
servations occurring within all of the regions. However,
for us observers who are confined to just one region, the
probabilities that such a superobserver might deduce for
the various combinations of joint observations are inac-
cessible for us to test or to use to predict what we might
be expected to see. Instead, we would like probabilities
for the observations we ourselves can make. I am as-
suming that each Oj is an observational result that in
principle we could have, but that we do not have access
to knowing which region L we are in. (The only proper-
ties of L that we can know are its local properties that
are known in the observation Oj itself, but that is not
sufficient to determine L, which might be determined by
properties of the spacetime beyond our local knowledge.)
III. EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT
OBSERVATIONAL PROBABILITIES FOR THE
SAME QUANTUM STATE
Let us demonstrate the logical freedom in the rules for
the observational probabilities Pj(i) ≡ P (Oj |Ti) by ex-
hibiting various examples of what they might be. For
simplicity, let us restrict attention to theories Ti that all
give the same pure quantum state |ψ〉, which can be writ-
ten as a superposition, with fixed complex coefficients
aN , of component states |ψN 〉 that each have different
numbers N of observational regions:
|ψ〉 =
∞∑
N=0
aN |ψN 〉, (3.1)
where 〈ψM |ψN 〉 = δMN . (Different values of N model
different sizes of universes produced by differing amounts
of inflation in the cosmological measure problem.) The
different theories will then differ only in the prescrip-
tions they give for calculating the observational proba-
bilities Pj(i) from the single quantum state |ψ〉. These
differences will illustrate the logical independence of the
observational probabilities from the quantum state, the
fact that the observational probabilities are not uniquely
determined by the state.
In each component state, the index L can run from 1
to N (except for the component state |ψ0〉, which has
no observational regions at all). As above, let us sup-
pose that PLj is a complete set of orthogonal projection
operators for the observation Oj to occur in the region
L. Then if only the region L existed, and the state were
|ψN 〉, then the quantum probability of the observation
Oj would be
pNLj = 〈ψN |P
L
j |ψN 〉. (3.2)
However, in reality, even just in the component state
|ψN 〉 for N > 1, there are other regions where the obser-
vation could occur, so the total probability Pj(i) for the
observation Oj in the theory Ti can be some i-dependent
function of all the pNLj ’s. The freedom of this function
is part of the independence of the observational proba-
bilities from the quantum state itself.
Let us define existence probabilities pj(i) that might
not be normalized to add up to unity when summed over
j for the different possible observational results Oj , and
then use Pj(i) for normalized observational probabilities
obeying Eq. (2.2). The different indices i will denote
different theories, in this case different rules for calculat-
ing the probabilities, since for simplicity we are assuming
that all the theories have the same quantum state |ψ〉.
Next, let us turn to different possible examples.
For theory T1, let us suppose that the existence prob-
ability pj(1) = 0 if there is no region L in any nonzero
component of the quantum state (|ψN 〉 with aN 6= 0)
that has a positive expectation value for PLj , so that∑
N,L |aN |
2pNLj = 0, but that pj(1) = 1 otherwise, that
is if
∑
N,L |aN |
2pNLj > 0. This theory is essentially tak-
ing the Everett many worlds interpretation to imply that
if there is any nonzero amplitude for the observation to
occur, it definitely exists somewhere in the many worlds
(and hence has existence probability unity).
Now of course these existence probabilities pj(1) are
not necessarily normalized, since M > 1 of them can be
unity, with the rest zero, so the sum of these existence
probabilities is M . However, one could say that so far as
the probability goes of making a particular one of the M
actually existing observations, that could be considered
equally divided between theM actually existing possibil-
ities (ifM > 0), so that one has normalized observational
probabilities Pj(1) = pj(1)/M . This would be the theory
that every observation that actually does exist is equally
probable.
For theory T2, define the existence probabilities to be
pj(2) = 〈ψ|Pj |ψ〉, the expectation value in the full quan-
tum state |ψ〉 of the projection operator Pj defined by
Eq. (2.4) for the existence of the observation Oj in at
least one region L. This is not the full many-worlds exis-
tence probability, which is unity if the observation does
occur somewhere, but it might be regarded as the quan-
tum probability for a superobserver to find that at least
one instance of the observation Oj occurs.
Again, these existence probabilities will not in general
sum to unity, but one can normalize by dividing by the
sumM (now generically not an integer) to get normalized
probabilities Pj(2) = pj(2)/M . For a universe that is
very large (e.g., most of the |aN |
2’s concentrated on very
large N ’s), one would expect a large number of pj(2)’s to
be very near unity (since it would be almost certain that
the observation Oj occurs at least somewhere among the
huge number of regions), so that there will be a large
number of nearly equal but very small Pj(2)’s.
For theory T3, refrain from defining the existence prob-
abilities pj(3) (since I am regarding it sufficient for a
theory to prescribe only the observational probabilities
of observations in regions within the universe, not for
observations by some putative superobserver). Instead,
4define unnormalized observational measures
µj(3) =
∑
L
〈ψ|PLj |ψ〉 =
∞∑
N=1
N∑
L=1
|aN |
2pNLj. (3.3)
Then normalize these to let the observational probabili-
ties be defined as
Pj(3) =
µj(3)∑
k µk(3)
. (3.4)
For theory T4, define unnormalized observational mea-
sures
µj(4) =
∞∑
N=1
1
N
N∑
L=1
|aN |
2pNLj (3.5)
and then normalized observational probabilities
Pj(4) =
µj(4)∑
k µk(4)
. (3.6)
Theory T3 in its sum over L effectively weights each
component state |ψN 〉 by the number of observational
regions where the observation Oj can potentially occur.
On the other hand, theory T4 has an average over L for
each total number N of observational regions, so that
component states |ψN 〉 do not tend to dominate the prob-
abilities for observations just because of the greater num-
ber of observational opportunities within them. Theory
T3 is analogous to volume weighting in the cosmological
measure, and theory T4 is analogous to volume averaging
[5].
Of these four rules, T1 does not give the probabilities as
the expectation values of natural observation operators
Qj(i), but the other three do, with the corresponding
observation operators being
Qj(2) =
Pj
〈
∑
k Pk〉i
,
Qj(3) =
∑
LP
L
j
〈
∑
k
∑
L P
L
k 〉i
,
Qj(4) =
∑
∞
N=1
1
N
∑N
L=1 PNP
L
j PN
〈
∑
k
∑
∞
N=1
1
N
∑N
L=1 PNP
L
kPN 〉i
, (3.7)
where PN = |ψN 〉〈ψN | is the projection operator onto
the component state with N observation regions.
These examples show that there is not just one unique
rule for getting observational probabilities from the quan-
tum state. It remains to be seen what the correct rule is.
Of the four examples given above, I suspect that with a
suitable quantum state, theory T4 would have the highest
likelihood Pj(i), given our actual observations, since the-
ories T1 and T2 would have the normalized probabilities
nearly evenly distributed over a huge number of possible
observations, and theory T3 seems to be plagued by the
Boltzmann brain problem [5]. One might conjecture that
theory T4 can be implemented in quantum cosmology to
fit observations better than other alternatives [5].
Thus we see that in a universe with the possibility of
multiple copies of an observer, observational probabili-
ties are not given purely by the quantum state, but also
by a rule to get them from the state. There is logical
freedom in what this rule is (or in what the observation
operatorsQj(i) are if the rule is that the probabilities are
the expectation values of these operators). In cosmology,
finding the correct rule is the measure problem.
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